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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
Research and Analysis Branch 


R & A No. 3376 


CLASSIFICATION 

Changed to 
UNRESTRICTED 

by authority of 

Date *7 /<?& '? 


RECiNT SWEDISH POLICY AND ACTICN WITH REGARD TO THE 
ADMISSION AND EXPULSICN OF REFUGEES 


Description 

This paper describes the policy decisions made and 
legislation enacted by Sweden on the admission and 
expulsion of aliens and indicates in so far as possi¬ 
ble the trends of Swedish action with particular 
regard to German and Baltic refugees. 


Washington, D. C, 

*13 September 1945 

79 

COPY NO._ 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 


I. Introduction . 1 

A. Scope of this Paper . 1 

B. Scope of Refugee Flow. 1 

1. Non-German Refugees . 1 

2. German Refugees . 3 

3. Swedish Public Agencies Involved . 4 

II. Swedish Treatment of Refugees ..... 4 

A. Official Action . 4 

1. Prior to the Fall of 1944 . 4 

2. Late 1944-1945 . 6 

3. Treatment of Special Cases . 9 

a. Germans . 9 

b. Baltic Refugees . 11 

3. Unofficial Attitude Towards Swedish Refugee Policy .. 13 

1. Pre-1945 . 13 

2. Later 1945 . 14 

III. Conclusion . 15 


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I. Introduction 

A. Scope of this Paper 

In the course of the Apprehension and trial of war criminals, whether 
on national or international levels, the-United Nations will probably find 

’ t 

it necessary to approach Sweden for the surrender of suspect persons. 

Sweden’s reaction to such approaches will undoubtedly be conditioned to a 
large extent by policy decisions already made as to the admission and ex- 
pulsion of aliens. .The extent to which Sweden can expeditiously and efficient¬ 
ly meet United Nations requests will depend in considerable measure upon how, 
far the United Nations seek to have her depart openly and drastically from 
these policies. It is therefore proposed in this paper' to add the material 
on these points which has become available as to Sweden since 15 January 1945,^ 
and to indicate as far as possible the trends of Swedish action. 

B. 'Scope of Refugee Flow 

1. Non-German Refugees The problems which Sweden has had to face and 
solve as to refugees are foreshadowed in the numbers of aliens, who have 
sought admission to Sweden since the war broke out in 1939. While some persons 
asked refuge in Sweden in 1940 and 1941, the flow of refugees was not signifi¬ 
cant until 1942. In that year there was a marked increase, with Norwegians 
forming the largest group seeking admission. From that period until the' 
closing months of the war, the tide of refugees increased. The official 

1. Date of R & A Report No. 2465.1, Right of Political Refugees to Asylum 
in Non-Belligerent Countries. 


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- 2 - f ,. 

break-down of the-flow of non-German refugees has been reported as follows 
by one source: " 



t 

r 

i 

1942 1 » 

1943 2 

f 

t 

« 

1944 3 

1945 4 * 


t 

i 



f 

f 


Children 

1 Total t 

N orwegians 

» 

9,000 » 

18,000 

t 

f 

30,000 

3,300 

f f 30,500 » 

Danes 

t 


9,000 


16,000 

3,000 

| 16,000 * 

Estonian Swedes 

t 


1,400 

! 


1,200 

6,500 1 

Other Baltic 

State Groups 

t 

t 

t 



f 

I 

f 

31,000 

4,000 

30,000 ' 

t 

Finns 

» 


4,000 

f 

87,000 

56,000 

t ' 79,000* 

Russians 

» 

* 


1,500 

l 



t 

t ^ 

Czechs 

1 

t 


700 

T 



t 

British 

T 

f 


500 

1 

f 



t 

r 

Miscellaneous 

t 

3,000 » 


T 


1,000 

18,000 » 

Total . 

1 

f 

f 

f 

12,000 * 

35,100 

t 

t 

t 

» 

164,000 

68,500 

*180,000’ 

_t_ 


1. News from Sweden , 18 November 1942. 

.2. Id., 24 November 1943. 

3. Id., 6 December 1944. ■--- • 

4. _Id., 14 March 1945. See also NeWTork Times, 2 June 1945. 


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-3- 

This tide has now started to ebb, as is demonstrated by figures re- 

2 

cently released by a Swedish source: 


1 

1 

1 

t 

t 

t 

t 

t 

1 April 1945 

t 

. 17 

i 

. t 

June 1945 

Decrease 

i 

Increase * 

? 

t 

» N orwegians 

f 

.37,000 

t 

i 

20,000 

17,000 

*T 

! 

f 

* Danes 

» 

15,500 

i 

t 

6,700 

8,800 

t 

t 

* Finns - 

■ General t 

6,000 

t 

f 

3,000 

3,000 

i 

? 

t 

Special t 


t 



i 

i 

Evacuees , 

27,000 

t 

13,900 

13,100 

t 

t 

i 

Children , 

41,600 

t 

t 

37,100 

4,500 

t 

» Poles 

f 

t 

i 

780 

» 

» 

. 9,300 


8,520 » 

» Dutch 

f 

i 

300 

» 

t 

1,340 


1,040 * 

» French 

f 

i 

t 

400 

t 

i 

2,000 


1,600 * 

» 

* Balkan 

t 

i 

groups , 

29,600 

i 

t 

25,000 

4,600 

t 

t 

’ Total 

i 

t 

t 

* t . • 

1 

158,180 

t 

t 

t 

r 

118,340 

51,000 

11,160 1 

» 

t 


2. German Refugees It seems even more difficult to obtain figures on 
the number of German refugees in Sweden. It has been reported that in 1943 

, g 

there, were 5,000. The figure was set at 5,594 on 1 April 1945 and at 5,755 
on 17 June 1945.^ 


1. Net total decrease of refugees during the period from 1 April 1945 to 
17 June 1945 was 39,840. 

2. CID 138180, 27 June. 194b; cf. New York Times , 2 June 1945. 

3. News from Sweden, 24 November 1943. 


4. CID 138180, 27 June 1945 


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- 4 - 

The German military in Sweden- before the collapse of Germany were re¬ 
ported as numbering 3200, of whom 250 were officers."^ Arrangements for 
their return were even then a matter of negotiation between Germany and 
Swe den. 

5 f Swedish Public Agencies Involved The administrative task of 

handling the problems arising from this influx of refugees was centered 

in the. Ministry of Social- Affairs headed by Minister Gustav Moeller. The 
♦ 

Aliens Commission,- one of the units within this ministry, had control of 
the issuance of permits to enter Sweden. Ernst Bexelius has been chairman 
of this commission. 

The Ministry-of Justice, which is headed at present by Thorwald 
Bergquist, has also been concerned with the refugee problem, because it is 
charged with duties as to screening of undesirable aliens. 

II. « Swedish Treatment of Refugees 

A. Official' Action 

1. Prior to the Fall of 1944 The Aliens Law, which was in operation 

during most of the war, provided four methods of excluding or expelling 
2 

undesirable aliens; 

a. extradition ( utaelmning ) of criminal elements upcn 
the direct request of a foreign power, a process 
which was not available in the case of those accused 
of political crimes; 

b. refusal of admission at the frontier (Awisning) which 
was used in the case of gypsies and similar grbups; 

1. Swedish Home Service , 2.3.J\ffarch 1945 , News Digest # 1767, p. 27. 

2. OSS Source D, # 4787, 22 November 1944. 

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u 

c. deportation on technical counts (Forpassing) such 
as false passports, illegal entry, etc.; 

d. and expulsion of persons guilty of crime or other¬ 
wise undesirable (Utvisning). 

It was through application of this machinery, that Sweden sought to regu¬ 
late the admission of aliens. 

The Swedish attitude toward refugees was liberal until the latter 

part of 1944. Thus, if an applicant for admission claimed status as a 

political refugee, he was said to have been accepted at his own valuation. 

While Sweden was not too enthusiastic about admitting foreigners, as is 

evidenced by its strict citizenship policy, a combination of expediency, 

good will and ethnic relationships motivated this liberal- policy. 

The chief factor insofar as expediency was concerned was the critical 

2 

labor shortage in Sweden. Refugees not only augmented the labor supply 
but also contributed to their own support. This process placed little or 
no burden on the Swedish authorities, since most of the refugees were 
aided by their own legation, which had special refugee bureaus. The few 
refugees who were not aided by their own legations found employment through 
the government-established Refugee Office. 


1. During this period, it was reliably reported that Sweden had. never re¬ 
fused to admit a,refugee.who sought admission, ibid. However, at least 
one Swedish paper stated that the policy on admission shifted •with the 
political and military situation. See Nu, 27 October 1944, News.Digest 
# 1591, p. 39. 

The press has also referred to the Swedish rdturn of an Austrian 
deserter from the German army, although this meant his execution. See 
Vecko-Journalen, 10 December .1944, News Digest 1629, p. 25'; Expressen, 
4 April 1945, ' News Digest jf=. 1727, p. 32. 

2. CID 104055, 4 July 1944. 

3. See, for example, OSS Source C, # 53812, December 1943. 


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’’Undesirable' aliens” who ordinarily would have been refused entry were 
also granted admission. This relaxation df 'the customary rule was based 
on the fact that the occupation authorities in neighboring countries had 
.established harsh penalties (in some cases, capital punishment) for cross¬ 
ing the border. Yifhile these people were admitted, they were segregated. 

Five camps were set up - Saters for the mentally ill, Langmora for first 
offenders, Smedsbo for those who had been politically active in. Sweden and 

•i 

were therefore under observation, Rengsjo for those exhibiting criminal 
n 

tendencies, and Halsingmo for Norwegian quislings. The classification of 
refugees for the purpose of segregation was in practice undertaken by the 
Norwegians and Danes.^ 

2.'Late 1944 - 1945 The military success of the United Nations 

forced a review and reorientation of Sv/edish refugee policy. The machinery 

-provided by the Aliens Law in force throughout the greater part of the war 

and the- admiiiistrative procedure thereunder was geared to a German-dominated 

Europe and to non-German refugees. Its inadequacy had been early felt and 

2 

■revisions were in preparation in the latter part of 1944. Upon the _ 

3 „ i 

recommendation of an investigating committee, new legislation was submitted 
to the Riksdag. Two statutes Were submitted, - one a general aliens law 


1. CID 104055, 4 July 1944. See also Swedish Press , 14 September 1944, News 

Digest # 1553, p. 37; Dagens Nyheter, 13 October 1944, News Digest 
#HLbbU, p. 28. --- ' - —- - - 

2. A commission had been appointed in 1943 to study the refugee problem. 

OSS, Source D, 15 January 1945. Minister Bergquist had announced on 13 
September 1944 that his ministry was reviewing its policies. Swedish 
Pres£,, 14 September 1944, News Digest # 1553, p. 37. He repeated this 
statement a month later. Swedish Press, 15 October 1944. 

3. OSS, Source D, 15 January 1945. 


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and the other, a provisional law to regulate internment of aliens in prisons 
and in camps.^ 

The new aliens law retains the existing passport regulations and pro¬ 
vides for supervision of aliens through the Aliens Commission, which hears 
the appeals from the decisions of local authorities on residence and ex¬ 
pulsion. It was to become operative on 1 July 1945. The text of this 
statute has not yet been reported. 

In the period before the new law became operative, the Aliens Com¬ 
mission was authorized to determine the country to which the alien was to 

2 

be deported, and to postpone the execution of deportation orders. This 
may be construed as empowering the commission to return aliens to their 
mother countries even though they may have claimed status as political 
refugees. 

During the period in which this action was in formulation, various 

officials charged with the execution of alien legislation issued statements 

indicative of the policy to be followed. On 6 September 1944, the Minister 

of Social Affairs, Gustav Moeller, stated that Sweden desired to admit all 

real refugees but that she would strive to keep out all undesirable aliens 

2 

and to place suspected quislings in separate custody. He also made it 
clear that Sweden would take a severe position toward those who had be¬ 
trayed their own-countries and toward those whose acts offended the 

1. OSS, Source D, 16 April 1945. 

2. OSS, Source D, 10 April 1945. 

3. OWI Source, 9 November 1944; see also New York Times, 6 September 1944, 

p. 10. 


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civilized world. This statement of policy was in effect reiterated by 

Minister of Justice Bergquist on 13 September 1944, although he laid greater 

stress on the humanitarian aspects of the refugee policy.^ The press has 

characterized the policy during this period as "delayed action expulsion," 

. . 2 
in which every case received separate treatment. 

This practice seems to have prevailed until the spring of 1945. In 

an announcement to the press on 4 April 1945, which was more detailed than 
• -3 

the March announcement of stricter polity. Minister of Justice Bergquist 

stated that there was a limit to the number of refugees which Sweden could 

receive and that Sweden could not distinguish with great accuracy between 

the sheep and the goats. He stated that all undesirables would be expelled, 

4 

and that a policy of general exclusion was the only solution. He was also 
of the opinion that an investigation of a refugee which produced no evidence 
prejudicial to him would not constitute a reason for permission to stay in 
Sweden. Five days later, the Cabinet announced that the refugee policy 
could not be made specific, that it would remain flexible, and carefully 
designed to exclude undesirable aliens, even to the extent of deviating 

from normal procedure and excluding individuals without an examination of 

.. . 5 

their cases. 


1. Swedish Press , 14 September 1944; News Digest $ 1553, p. 37. 

2. OSS, Source D, 25 November 1944. See a similar statement of' 21 March 
1945, by Minister of Justice Bergquist. FCC Ticker quoting Swedish 
European Service, 22 March 1945. 


3. Swedish Overseas Service , 28 March 1945; News Digest # 1721, p. 35. 

4. Swedish O verseas Service, 4 April 1945; Nev/s Digest =jj= 1726, p. 32; see 
also News from Sweden, 4 April 1945. 

Minister Bergquist also indicated that there might be special cases, 
in which Swedish family relations or other special reasons-might-be-alleged 
for entry, but felt that such special reasons must be "strong and positive.. 

5. FCC Ticker, quoting Swedish Home Service, 9 April 1945; News Digest # 1727, 
p. 32; Swedish Overseas Service. 


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The statement of Minister Bergquist was followed shortly by the issu¬ 
ance of regulations which permitted the alien control authorities to issue 

direct expulsion orders,^ - thus expediting the process of expulsion. The 

2 

military authorities also received special instructions at this time. 

3. Treatment of Special Cases 

a. Germans As the German military machine collapsed, Sweden 
was confronted with an increasing number of German refugees. Until April 
1945, there seems to have been no special procedure established for them. 

They were screened immediately upon arrival by medical and police authori¬ 
ties. In the case of members of the Wehrmacht and its political and 
military organizations, military authorities intervened. Neither the 

Civilian Defense Board-nor the military authorities could, however, reject 

2 

them as a matter of course, but had to apply existing.regulations. After 
the strict exclusion policy had been announced.Minister Bergquist stated 
to the press that all Germans would be sent back to Germany to be dealt 
with by the German authorities. While reserving any answer on inquiries 
as to the effect of an Allied war criminal list, he explicitly stated that 
Allied occupation would make no difference.^ 

There seems to have been no further official statement on the treat¬ 
ment of Germans seeking admission to Sweden .until 12 May 1945. At that 

1. FCC Wire, quoting Swedish European Service, 10 April 1945. 

2. OSS, Source D, 25 April 1945. 

3. Aftontigningen (Stockholm), 3 April 1945, News Digest 1726, p. 32. 

The New York Times reported under a Stockholm date line that Reich 
civilians would be returned but that this policy decision would not af¬ 
fect military deserters or persons in quarantine, 10 April 1945. Later 
it reported that 30 German civilians had been returned via Denmark, under 
a decision of the Aliens Commission. New York Times, 23 April 1945. 

4. Swedish Press, 4 April 1945, News Digest 1726, p. 32. 


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time, the Defense Staff announced that all Germans in Wehraacht or Gestapo 
uniforms would be refused entry and that, if they succeeded in entering, 
they would be disarmed and expelled.'*’ The same statement made it clear 
that boats carrying exclusively uniformed persons would be turned away, but 
that craft with mixed civilian and military passengers would be interned 
by the appropriate authorities. Similar rules were laid down for aircraft. 
It also stated that Norwegian and Danish collaborators, civilians who had 
no Swedish entry permits, and persons from German war prisons would be 
taken into police custody. 

As to the special case of the German diplomats in Sweden, they were 

interned in a special camp at the request of the Foreign Office and were 

2 

not required to do physical labor. On 31 May 1945, Foreign Minister 

»» 5 

Gunther announced that it was the intention of the Government to return 
all officers and employees of the former German legation and consulates, 
with their families, to Germany, subject to the approval of the Control 

4 

Council, but that no answer had been received from the Allies. Some 350 


1. OSS, Source D, 12 May 1945. 

2. Oss, Source H, 23 May 1945. 

3. Gunther, since the time of this statement has been replaced as foreign 
minister by Osten Unden. 

4. ' OSS, Source D, 31 May.1945. 


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- 11 - 

persons were involved. This return has now taken place.^ 

b. Baltic Refugees The majority of Baltic refugees in Sweden 

had fled from the republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the 

* * 

2 

period of the German retreat in 1944. Many of these refugees, in the 
early part of the war, had conducted an active campaign on Swedish soil de¬ 
signed to enlist support for the restoration of the independence of the 
Baltic states. These activities which aroused considerable criticism from 
the Soviet press had at least been tolerated by the Swedish officials 
until the latter part of 1944. At this time, the Swedish Government 
attempted to restrict such activities and to bring its general refugee 

3 

policy in regard to these purposes more in line with Soviet views. 

In 1945, Counsellor Ungzell, chief of the Legal Division of. the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry, issued a statement defining the legal status of 
the Baltic refugees in Sweden. Ungzell declared that those refugees who 
had arrived recently in Sweden must be considered as Soviet citizens. 

Those who resided in Sweden prior to August, 1940 - the time’ of the .in-, 
corporation of these republics into the Soviet Union - and who failed to 
register as Soviet citizens, provided they had not since acquired another 


1. Press reports indicated that the first transport of 180 persons would 
leave 18 August 1945, New York Times, 11 August 1945. The transport 
sailed in fact on time. New York Times, 20 August 1945, p. 19. 

Sweden received the Japanese diplomats who fled from Berlin and 
allowed them to remain, because deportation y/as not then possible. 

See OSS, Source D, 29 May 1945. 

2. cf. R & A Report No.' 3072, Recent Refugee .Movement's from the Soviet 
Union. 

3. For a more detailed account of these activities, cf. 'R & A Report No. 
2972, Sweden and the USSR: The Swedish Attitude'and Policy. 


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- 12 - 

citizenship, would be considered as stateless persons.^ - This statement 
would appear to be in line with the subsequent decision of the Swedish 
Government to return the Baltic refugee boats which had been demanded by 
the USSR.^ The Swedish Minister of Justice, in presenting the draft law 
outlining the procedures for such a return, stated explicitly that although 
the title of these ships was in some cases questionable, it could not be 
denied that in so far as these boats were included in the nationalization 
of private property in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, they must be con¬ 
sidered as Soviet property. The law was approved by the Riksdag on 9 May 
1945. During this same period, Swedish officials granted Soviet representa¬ 
tives permission to visit the Baltic refugees for the purpose of re- 

4 n 5 

patriating those who desired to return home. Foreign Minister Gunther, 
in reply to ah interpellation in the Riksdag concerning the allegedly 
offensive manner in which these visits were'being conducted, .defended the 
right of the Russian officials t‘o visit their countrymen but denied the 
existence of any Swedish-Soviet pact covering compulsory repatriation of 

it 

these persons as had been alleged in the interpellation. Gunther added that 
in general Sweden favored the return of all these persons to their home¬ 
land but implied that Sweden would not repatriate any of them against their 

* 

will.^ Although some Swedish circles regarded the Russian request as a 


1. OSS, Source D., 6 February 1945. This statement was reported to be at vari¬ 
ance with other statements issued by members of the "Foreign Office and with 
previous Swedish practice- in regard to passports for these persons. Swedish 
officials had issued '’foreigners passports” to these persons which defined 
their present and former citizenship as Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. 

2. OSS, Source D, 12 April 1945. 

3. OSS, Source D, 12 May 1945. 

4. OSS, Source D, 3 April 1945. It should be noted in this connection that 
the Chief of the Aliens Commission (Bexelius) is reported to have stated 
that-only-one percent, of the Baltic refugees in Sweden desire to return hone. 

5. _cf. supra , p. 10, No. 3. 

6. OSS, Source D, 16„April 1945 and 9 May 1945. 


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preliminary step to a formal request for the extradition•of these persons,"^ 

2 

no such request has been reported to date. 

B. Unofficial Attitude Towards Swedish Refugee Policy 

1. Pre-1945 Prior to 1945, the S^vedish public - both, laymen and 
members of the legal profession - was chiefly preoccupied with the relation¬ 
ship of Sweden to the general problems involved in the trials of war 

I! 

criminals. Osten Unden, distinguished jurist and recently appointed 
Foreign Minister in Sweden, writing in conjunction with Ragnar Bergen dal. 
Professor of Jurisprudence in Lund University, stated firmly that Sweden 
must not become a refuge for individuals who in prominent or subordinate 
positions have played a part in the maintenance of the ’’gangster rule” of 
the Axis powers. Unden, in developing the general subject of war criminal 
trials pointed out that it would be too much to expect these trials to be 
free from motives of revenge and retribution regardless of the desirability 
of impassionate trials. As regards those persons to be tried by such courts. 
Unden strongly emphasized that defendants involved in such crimes as mass 
murder must not be permitted to escape justice by the plea of superior 

3 

Orders. 


1. OSS CID 120006, 6 March.1945. 

2. OSS, Source D, 29 May 1945 

3. Svensk Juristtidning , (Swedish Law Journal.) IIews .Digest .-1 .1624, 
5 December 1944, p. 36. 


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The Swedish press has expressed a similar concern oyer the manner in 
which the trials of war criminals shall be conducted. There was no desire 
to protect war criminals but there was an equally strong feeling that 
Sweden must not contribute in any way to the punishment of innocent people 
as war criminals.^ This feeling would appear to be in line with, the 
Swedish official policy statements in regard to the return of Norwegian and 
Danish quislings. In February, 1945, it was expressly stated by Bergquist 

that these persons will not be returned by Sweden until an orderly legal 

2 

process is once again functioning in these states. 

2. Later 1945 Since January 1945 Swedish press comment appears to 
have confined itself chiefly to comments on the specific steps taken by 
the Government to bring its refugee policy in line with the changing 
conditions. These ste-ps were favorably commented on by the press in regard 

to the German refugees, and at least tacitly accepted in the case of the 
3 

Baltic refugees, The introduction of the new aliens bill in the Riksdag 
in the spring of 1945 was hailed by the press as a‘necessary measure> which, 
despite the harshness of some of its terms, would enable Sweden to keep • 
herself free from "Nazi infection and terrorists’* and would convince the 
Allies of the sincerity of Swedish intentions.^ 

1. Stockholms Tidningen (conservative) cited in OSS, Source D, 19 October 

1944; Dagens Nyheter (liberal) and Svenska Dagbladet (conservative) cited 
in OSS, Source D, 18 October 1944; Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snellposten 
(conservative), cited in News Digest" #1569, 1 October 1944 and # 1585, 

23 October 1944. 

.2. News From Sweden, 28 February 1945; cf. also FCC: Ticker, 22 March 1945 
quoting Swedish European Service in Norwegian. 

3* cf. R & A Report No. 2972, op. cit . 

4. Ibid., Release #211, 4 April 1945; News Digest, # 1727, 4 April 1945, 
p. 32; FCC: Ticker, quoting Swedish European Service, 10 April 1945. 


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15 


III. Conclusion 

Swedish legislation and policy statements in themselves would seem to 
constitute no appreciable obstacle to the United Nations’ aims with respect 
to war criminals. The action which has been taken by Swedish officials to 
date indicates that Sweden is prepared to give these statements as wide an 
interpretation as is consistant with her sovereign rights in the admission 
and exclusion of refugees and to maintain a flexible refugee policy geared 
to the circumstances of the times. To date Swedish action has been 
centered largely on the refusal to admit certain types of refugees. The 
question of surrender on demand of the United Nations of alleged war 
criminals who may have succeeded in entering the country has not yet become 

I 

an issue. From such action as Sweden has taken in this regard and from 
comments, both official and unofficial, it would appear that the determining 
criteria of surrender will be the type of trial which awaits the individual 
to be surrendered in the requesting state. Thus, it may be expected that 
Sweden will more readily surrender alleged war criminals to countries ad¬ 
hering to well established principles of "due process" than to countries in 
which political considerations seem to outweigh legal scruples. 


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